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Introduction:
UN Peacekeeping and Assistance missions have often been vital to the protection of
civilians, implementation of transitional governments, and stabilization of nations and large
regions.
Yet, these two forms of U.N. missions are different. UN Peacekeeping Operations
(PKOs) are essentially military forces deployed primarily to protect civilians. Protecting civilians
often means that peacekeepers must collaborate with local groups first and foremost to prevent
conflict. These operations often use civil servants who: a) provide expertise on topics varying
from child protection to prevention of sexual violence, b) have soldiers who act as police, c) use
armed force as a deterrent to warring groups from committing human rights abuses, and d)
enforce ceasefire agreements.1
UN Assistance and Support missions differ from PKOs. While PKOs are charged with
peacekeeping and peace maintenance, Assistance and Support missions are typically deployed to
help national building, providing experts to help guide governments into how they might best
establish control over a certain area and improve the living conditions within that area.
Since 2000, UN missions have been structured to be large organizations with broad
doctrines that are expected to solve a myriad of issues that arise in areas of conflict. As
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have become crucial parts of international conflict, the
UN has adapted its ‘use of force’ policies to reflect the reality of global conflicts. UN missions
now are often run in conjunction with an international military force that is created by primarily
Western democracies to conduct counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations. North
American Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US have conducted many of these

1

"Protecting Civilians," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed December 7, 2021,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protecting-civilians.
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counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, as well as France and the Group of 5
Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger -- countries that are in the
Sahel region of Sub-Saharan Africa). While these military operations may be important for the
stabilization of a region, they sometimes run counter to the mission's larger goals of civilian
protection, implementation of peace agreements, or support of governments.
In essence, since 2000, UN missions have been created in such a way in which they have
contradicting directives. On the one hand, they are tasked with stabilizing a country and working
with multilateral counterterrorism forces, like Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. On
the other hand, the missions are expected to help with state-building and remain impartial actors.
In all of the cases I’ve studied, the missions have worked extensively to address the first
directive of stabilization, but largely failed at their other mandated goals. Moreover, even where
the missions have proven unsuccessful, the structure of the mission and force collaboration has
yet to change.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) itself has explicitly stated that it believes UN missions
should not be engaging in counterterrorism.2 The UNSC has also emphasized that, when UN
missions find it prudent to engage with a parallel international counterterrorism force, they
should “maintain a clear division of labour and distinction of roles.”3 Whether or not UN
missions have obtained a separation of roles is almost irrelevant, because they have largely been
perceived to not be “clearly delineated” from their parallel forces.4 The UN believes that
collaboration with these forces is necessary for stabilization within a country. Stability is often a
small part of peacekeeping and state-building operations. However I’ve found that these
missions often value stability over every other mandated goal, neglecting other essential pieces
2

United Nations General Assembly 70 (June 17, 2015) 12
Ibid. 12
4
Ibid. 12
3
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of their mandates. The missions have prioritized stability because stability is the priority of the
wealthy Western democracies that dominate the UN. A stabilized nation is one which is
characterized by a lack of widespread violence within its borders, and a level of resiliency given
various economic, social, or political shocks. More importantly, destabilized states are seen by
these Western democracies as breeding grounds for terrorism, which these countries see as a
formidable threat. Nevertheless, when a mission prioritizes stabilization, engagement with large,
multilateral counterterrorism or counterinsurgency forces is simultaneously necessary and a kiss
of death. Through looking at four UN missions, I have concluded that current UN missions face
a use of force paradox. What this means is that these missions collaborate with multilateral
counterterrorism forces for stability purposes, which, eventually, erodes the missions’ abilities to
state build, protect civilians, and remain impartial. Through these cases, I believe that the
missions are doomed to fail. Each of these missions often requires stability to complete its goals,
but in order to ensure stability within its area of purview, the mission must engage with
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
In my thesis, I argue that this engagement in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
in the name of stability is counterproductive to the mission’s ability to accomplish its mandated
goals because they either hinder the impartiality of the mission or erode the larger reputation
of the UN and its various legal doctrines. I compared two PKOs, the UN Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and two assistance missions,
the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA), to see how the missions’ collaboration with counterterrorism forces hurt the
missions in the long-term. Multilateral counterterrorism forces often designate some armed
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groups as being the “enemy,” and employ others in fighting terrorism. This designation of groups
as ‘good or bad’ can, in turn, alienate people who have connections or are harmed by a certain
group. Because of this, I have found that the PKOs face issues with impartiality
post-collaboration, hindering the peacekeepers’ ability to act as a third-party observer, as it is
now seen in these countries to be an actor in the armed conflict. The assistance and support
missions are also hindered by their collaboration, but in a slightly different way; the missions’
reputations were harmed by Western forces accomplishing their own concrete goals, like
NATO’s enforcement of a no-fly zone and arms embargo in Libya, but not focusing on any
state-building capabilities and refusing to engage in the Second Libyan Civil War. This lack of
engagement has the potential to erode large legal doctrines, like the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P), which is a global political commitment established in 2005 whose main goal is to prevent
genocide. R2P requires all UN member states to take action when any individual state is failing
to protect its citizens from ethnic cleansing, genocide, or war crimes.

How the Military Force and UN Mission Cooperation Began:
The military and mission collaborations started in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Since
events like the September 11th attacks, ‘Blackhawk Down,’ and various other terrorist attacks,
terrorism, and insurgency have become some of the foremost issues in conflicts After the UN
peacekeeping failures of Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia in the 1990s,5 the organization tried to
restructure its rules of engagement, allowing peacekeepers more leeway in when they can use
deadly force. In Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia the UN missions were extremely limited in their
scope and resources. For example, in Rwanda, peacekeepers could not use deadly force as a

5

Giovanna Kuele and Marco Cepik, "Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and
Security," The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 45

Lee 6

deterrent against the Hutu government, which resulted in a genocide occurring while the
Rwandan peacekeeping mission was actively deployed. In the aftermath of such failures, the UN
pendulated in the opposite direction, creating UN missions with overly expansive mandates. In
the Brahimi Report, a report which sought to explore changes in peacekeeping policy, the Chair
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations Lakhdar Brahimi argued that, for UN Peace
Operations to be effective, they would need to be backed by “bigger forces, better equipped and
more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat.”6 This was in opposition to the more
limited forces deployed in previous UN missions. The missions that I’ve analyzed were created
in the aftermath of this report. Therefore, these missions undertake large over-reaching goals and
work with state rebuilding and peace enforcement.7
This structure differs greatly from the pre-Brahimi missions, which were focused on
monitoring ceasefires and ensuring peace within a very specific region. The Brahimi-report
restructuring was directed at helping PKO and assistance missions use force to complete their
mandated goals. However, UNAMA (created in 2001) and MONUSCO (partially created in
2000) have still failed to reach their goals. UNAMA was supposed to help the newly formed
Afghan government after the US’s invasion in 2001. It failed to substantially reach this goal as
the country fell to the Taliban. This is partially due to the importance Western democracies
placed on counterterrorism initiatives in Afghanistan, rather than state-building. MONUSCO was
mandated to help mitigate the conflict in the Congo as a third-party civilian protection force. It
collaborated with an international force to eradicate one of the armed groups and is now seen as
a party to the armed conflict. Terrorist groups target the PKOs directly, which hinders their
ability to protect civilians as they need to protect themselves. Therefore, it is puzzling that the
6

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report). 21 Aug.
2000, undocs.org/A/55/305. Accessed 18 Nov. 2021. 9.
7
Kuele and Cepik, "Intelligence Support," 45.
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Brahimi-report structure has yet to change given the failures of the missions that have been
structured under the directives of the report.
Moreover, many have viewed peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool that can be
employed to create more stability within a region, such as dealing with the threat of terrorism,8
but fail to realize that PKOs are usually meant to operate with a very specific set of goals, such
as state-building and ceasefire enforcement. These goals are more difficult to achieve when the
UN is perceived as using force for counterterrorism. The Brahimi report suggested that these
missions should have large forces that work as a deterrent for malignant actors. Contrastingly,
the UN outlined in its Global Counterterrorism strategy how eradicating terrorism should be a
pre-emptive strategy, focusing on conflict prevention. Moreover, the UN General Assembly
emphasized the necessity that it engages with counterterrorism only while abiding by
international law and continuing to uphold human rights.9 What this means in practice is that UN
missions should not engage with multilateral counterterrorism, lest they be seen as partial. The
impartiality of UN missions is essential to their state-building capabilities, and, under the UN
Counterterrorism strategy, the best way in which the UN can help to mitigate terrorist threats is
via conflict prevention. Therefore, engaging in any activity that hinders a UN mission’s ability to
fulfill its mandate is actively working against the larger counterterrorism goals. Furthermore,
because the UN and its uses of force have largely been dominated by Western democracies’
interests, many of these missions have become convoluted, as a “mission inside a mission.”10
These Western forces have been unable to successfully integrate with the larger mission and its
goals.
8

Maline Meiske and Andrea Ruggeri, "Peacekeeping as a Tool of Foreign Policy," in Oxford Research Encyclopedia
of Politics (Oxford UP, 2017), 462.
9
United Nations General Assembly, "The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy," The United Nations,
last modified September 20, 2006, accessed December 5, 2021, 5
10
John Karlsrud, "For the Greater Good?: 'Good States' Turning UN Peacekeeping towards Counterterrorism,"
International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 74, no. 1 (March 2019): 66
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The expansive mandates and collaboration with multilateral military forces are not
successful, but the structures of these missions have failed to change. Each of the four missions I
look at has been criticized for some feature or deemed a failure altogether. MONUSCO and
MINUSMA are criticized by local citizens for being partial to armed groups and militias in the
region, while UNAMA and UNSMIL are criticized for not doing enough to protect civilians and
working disjointedly with NATO and US forces.
By researching UNAMA, UNSMIL, MONUSCO, and MINUSMA, I’ve found that all
missions have conflicting goals. The post-Brahimi restructuring of UN missions has been
ineffective, but the UN is still implementing these large, overreaching missions that are doomed
to fail. The paradox of needing security, but also needing impartiality is an insurmountable issue
that the UN should have addressed after the first mission failures. It has not.

Previous Research:
This topic has been discussed previously, most notably by Dennis C. Jett, a professor of
International Relations at Penn State and former U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique and Peru. He
wrote, Why Peacekeeping Fails, in 2000 and discussed the various missions in Somalia, Rwanda,
and Bosnia and their subsequent failures. In that edition of his book, he discusses how the limited
scope and military capability of PKOs eventually led to their downfall in the 1990s but aided
their popularity less than a decade earlier.11 Jett specifically references two important dates to
describe this phenomenon: December 11, 1988, and October 1993. On December 11, the UN
received the Nobel Peace Prize for its peacekeeping operations. This was seen as the apex of
peacekeeping achievement. However, less than five years later, 18 American soldiers were killed

11

Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 3.
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on a peacekeeping mission to Somalia.12 The killing of these soldiers showed the stark reality of
peacekeeping versus the ideal. Unfortunately, peacekeepers were not able to fulfill the grand
goals put in place and expected of them because they were being improperly deployed and
constrained to very strict rules of engagement. The Brahimi report was supposed to address the
“negative image” that was left after the atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda and the perceived
ineffectiveness of the PKOs in those areas.
However, in the recent edition of his book of the same name Jett describes how this
phenomenon has played out with PKOs in the post-Brahimi report era. He writes,
“The main reason the most recently launched peacekeeping missions will fail is
because peacekeeping has become a way for rich countries to send the soldiers of poor
countries off to deal with the wars the rich countries do not care much about. The
fundamental problem is that there is no peace to keep in these conflicts and the soldiers
being sent as peacekeepers are incapable of achieving the goals that are being assigned to
them”13
Jett describes a conundrum in which peacekeepers were unable of accomplishing their
mandated goals in the 1980s and the 1990s because they were not given rules of engagement that
were broad enough to allow their intervention in these genocides and ethnic cleansings. But,
since the Brahimi report, while the missions now have large enough rules of engagement, they
are now being sent to places in which peace has not been accomplished, and are given Sisyphean
tasks of keeping peace amongst ethnic conflict, terrorism, and global military operations.
Essentially, Jett describes the conflict curve (see Figure 1.1), and attributes many of the
peacekeepers’ failures to the fact that they were asked to step into conflict during the crisis

12
13

Jett, Why Peacekeeping, 3.
Ibid, 20.
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management and peacekeeping phases, rather than the peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
What this means is that peacekeepers, rather than being used for their original roles of enforcing
ceasefires, protecting civilians, etc., are now asked by the wealthy countries to get involved in
the conflict, to make peace and stability, rather than enforce and maintain it.

Figure 1.1

Other authors have also voiced concerns about conflicting objectives in UN peacekeeping
on a structural level. For example, Duane Bratt, a political science professor at Mount Royal
University wrote:
“The UN has two main objectives. The first is to establish and maintain
international peace and security. The second is to improve the political, economic, and
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social justice of the world’s peoples. Although the founders of the UN expected that these
two objectives could be reconciled, they have frequently tended to compete.”14
In Bratt’s assessment of UN peacekeeping operations, he argues that there is a tension
between peace and justice in such a way that peacekeepers not only are asked to build both peace
and justice, but also that establishing justice helps the UN with long-term goals, but is also
overlooked for short-term ‘victories’ in peace and security (e.g. saving lives). He describes a
common issue that the UN faces as it works to contain present threats and, in doing so, depletes
the resources necessary to defeat future threats. Bratt argues that, in order for the UN to restore
popularity in all its peacekeeping operations, “the objective of saving lives must take clear
priority over attempts to make the world more just. Although we may find that peace can exist
without justice, there will never be justice without peace.”15
I agree with both Bratt’s and Jett’s assessments of peacekeeping missions, and I explain
how both analyses of PKO objectives are present in the four missions I explore. Jett’s argument
of wealthy countries using PKOs as proxy fighters in wars that are unpopular in their own
country is present in MINUSMA and MONUSCO. Bratt’s description of justice and peace is
present in all four missions as international military forces work to dismalte terrorist
organizations and stabilizing regions, doing work that Bratt would consider to be
“justice-seeking.”
That being said, I believe neither Bratt nor Jett go far enough. While PKOs have been
unsuccessful since the 1980s, the same tactics of stabilization and using UN missions to do the
‘dirty work’ of the wealthy countries’ interests can also be seen in assistance missions. These
missions are explicitly tasked with peacemaking as well as post-conflict peacebuilding and
14

Duane Bratt, "Peace over Justice: Developing a Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations in International
Conflicts," Global Governance 5, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 63, accessed April 27, 2022
15
Ibid. 77-78.
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reconciliation, even when the conflicts are far from over. Jett posits that PKOs continue to be so
ineffective at preventing violence and mitigating conflict, decades after Rwanda and Bosnia,
because they are set up for failure, facing large mandated goals which only benefit wealthy
countries, while being under equipped and trained to undertake the responsibility of
peacemaking. Bratt explores the tension of justice and peace solely within the structure of UN
peacekeeping operations, but does not expand his argument to the forces that the missions
collaborate with, or assistance missions.

Methods:
In creating my research design, I wanted to explore the tensions described by Bratt and
Jett but through both peacekeeping and assistance missions. While UN peacekeeping work is
essential to its foundation and goals, many of the modern UN missions that operate in areas of
warfare are assistance missions, or ‘Special Political Missions.’ These missions, rather than
structured with the main goal of protecting civilians, have priorities of conflict prevention or
supporting peace processes. They are slightly newer, with the first ones being created in 1996.
Peacekeeping missions, on the other hand, have been around since 1948 and are supposed to
work in the peace enforcement or peace-keeping stage of conflict, ensuring limited violence
against civilians in their areas of operation. Because these missions are supposed to be structured
differently, it was essential that I chose both assistance missions and peacekeeping missions to
get a comprehensive study of all the satellite operations that the UN conducts in areas of conflict.
I chose UNSMIL and UNAMA as my assistance, or special political missions. Operating
in Libya and Afghanistan, they were prone to heavy Western-military interference because the
US had begun an invasion in Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom and, along with
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NATO’s support, conducted interventional operations in Libya with Operation Odyssey Dawn.
Moreover, both of these missions faced larger repercussions after the UN missions began as both
Afghanistan and Libya descended into violence during the missions' tenures. Studying these
missions allow me to show the same tension of Western governments’ priorities that Jett
describes in peacekeeping operations, as well as Bratt’s theory of friction between peace and
justice objectives in assistance missions.
I also chose the UN peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), I use the same frameworks as both Jett and Bratt in exploring peacekeeping
directly, but rather than exploring Western countries’ priorities and the tension between peace
and justice, I specifically look at counterterrorism. These cases are especially relevant due to
their unique structures with counterterrorism forces that are either under the control of the
mission or collaborate very closely with it. The UN effort in Mali was partnered with a
counterterrorism force created by its neighboring countries (the Joint Force on counterterrorism
Group of 5 Sahelian countries) and the UN effort in the DRC has a multilateral military
counterterrorism force within the mission, called the Force Intervention Brigade.
In studying MINUSMA, UNSMIL, UNAMA, and MONUSCO, I will use Jett’s and
Bratt’s hypotheses on the failures of peacekeeping. extend those same theories to UN assistance
missions and prove that when UN missions collaborate with counterterrorism military
interactions, they are doomed to fail.

MINUSMA
Throughout the UN’s efforts in Mali, the UN’s priorities have slowly turned to
stabilization actions with the urging of wealthy Western Democracies and the surrounding
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Sahelian countries. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA) has provided support for and teamed up with the Joint Force on
Counterterrorism by the Group of 5 Sahelian countries (JF-G5S). This force has a bad reputation
within Mali, and by engaging with the JF-G5S counterterrorism actions in the name of
stabilization, MINUSMA has eroded its impartiality. This erosion has made its goals of
enforcing peace agreements and protecting civilians more difficult, as the mission does not have
the full trust and support of the local population.

Background:
The conflict in Mali began in January of 2012, when Tuareg (a Malian ethnic group)
rebels, who were a part of the Mouvement de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) joined forces with
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Ansar Eddine and Mouvement pour l’unicité
et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) to oust the Malian Army from the northern region of
the country. This attack and the military’s perceived lack of government support eventually led to
a coup d’état, which, in turn, harmed the counterterrorism initiatives, as the paralyzed state could
not mitigate the attack by the rebel groups in the north.16 Then, jihadists groups AQIM, MUJAO,
and Ansar Eddine hijacked the uprising and subsequently forced their rule over the
rebel-conquered northern territories. This later raised concerns about jihadism and the imposition
of sharia law. As a result, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on Resolution 2085 on
December 20, 2012, which approved a counterterrorism force deployment to Mali: the
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).17 France created its own military
intervention, called Operation Serval, which worked in conjunction with the Malian military to
16

Bruno Charbonneau, "Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism," Journal
of Contemporary African Studies 35, no. 4 (August 8, 2017): 417, accessed October 5, 2021
17
Ibid. 417
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help defeat Islamic militants in the north. Operation Serval was not a part of the deployment of
AFISMA, but the intervention was encouraged by both the UN and the Malian government as a
way to provide military, human rights, and humanitarian law training.18 Operation Serval also
worked in conjunction with AFISMA to build Malian Defense Forces’ capacity. This operation
lasted a year and a half from early 2013 to mid-2014 and laid the groundwork for later military
operations.
AFISMA, the UN authorized counterterrorism military force, was also supposed to help
train Malian Defense forces and protect civilians.19 Because Mali had just faced a coup and did
not have the military capacity to fight both the rebel groups in the north and terrorist
organizations, like Boko Haram and AQIM, the Economic Coalition of West African States,
determined that a mission like AFISMA would be prudent in helping build the capacity of
Malian Troops. This Economic Coalition was previously tasked with creating a strategic solution
for the crisis in Mali.
Shortly after AFISMA’s creation, in April 2013, the UNSC voted on Resolution 2100 to
establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA). This resolution transferred the military affairs to MINUSMA from AFISMA,
dissolving AFISMA completely. 20 This resolution also stated that MINUSMA will consist of
11,200 personnel. Moreover, this resolution stated that one of the mandated goals of MINUSMA
is to protect “without prejudice” civilians under imminent threat.21 The wording of this mandated

18

United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2085 - the Situation in Mali," United Nations, last modified
December 20, 2012, accessed November 22, 2021, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2085.
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Ibid.
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"MINUSMA History," The United Nations, accessed December 10, 2021,
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United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2100 - Mali," United Nations, last modified April 25, 2013,
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goal is significant because it emphasizes the importance of impartiality within the mission so that
the peacekeepers can adequately protect any and all civilians caught in the conflict.
Moreover, since 2015, MINUSMA has been focused on enforcing the Algiers
Agreement. This agreement was formed between the Malian Government, pro-government
forces, and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (an alliance of rebel groups) in 2015 to
ensure peace in the country. There were five pillars to the agreement, which addressed: 1) a
negotiation framework, 2) how to reorganize Malian states to create a more regionally focused
government, 3) how to continue to work towards peace and security in Mali, 4) what the
socioeconomic and developmental goals will look like, and 5) how to ensure transitional justice
and reconciliation. Mainly, the agreement worked on regionalization in Mali, creating a new
national army, and working on economic development in the north. What this means is that
certain groups, like the Coordination of Azawad Movements, would gain more control over the
northern areas; this division of government would ensure that northern Malians’ grievances are
heard and can be dealt with through a coordinated effort by the local and national government.22
For the Algiers Agreement to be constituted, each of the signatories must work on internal social
and political reforms so that the Coordination of Azawad Movements and the Malian
government could collaborate and take action. MINUSMA has been working on enforcing the
aspects of the Algiers agreement on the various groups, and impartiality is essential to this goal
as well because the UN should work as a mediator in the role of enforcing this agreement.
While the formation of MINUSMA did not pose any issues, the establishment of
AFISMA and then MINUSMA shows the rapidly changing nature of the Malian conflict. The

22

"Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process," The United Nations, last
modified July 24, 2014, accessed December 10, 2021,
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Malian conflict is a multi-faceted issue as there is both the civil war with the rebel group Azawad
movements, and terrorist groups operating in the region, such as Boko Haram, AQIM, and
MUJAO. From 2013 onwards, MINUSMA struggled with mitigating the terrorist groups in Mali,
which led the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) to form a
Joint Force to fight terrorism in February 2017, the JF-G5S.23 The G5S is a coordination
framework and began in 2014 as a way to collaborate on counterterrorism operations and the
economic development of the region. In practice, this means that the Chiefs of Staff of the five
countries’ armies collaborate to ensure that their counterterrorism operations are a coordinated
effort by the use of the Joint Force G5S (JF-G5S). The UN supported the formation of the
JF-G5S with the Resolution 2359 in June of 2017.24 MINUSMA was mainly supposed to support
human rights and the protection of civilians, while the JF-G5S was created to:
“(a) combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and human trafficking, with the aim of creating a
more secure environment in the Sahel region by eradicating “terrorist armed groups”
(TAGs) and organized criminal groups; (b) contribute to the restoration of state authority
and the return of displaced persons and refugees; (c) facilitate humanitarian assistance;
and (d) assist development efforts.”25
Seeing the contribution of stability to Mali by the JF-G5S, which, in turn, helped fulfill
MINUSMA’s mandate, the UNSC asked MINUSMA to provide additional support to the JF-G5S
in Mali until the force could become self-sustaining.26 This also resulted in the JF-G5S being
temporarily stationed at the MINUSMA headquarters from the creation of the force in 2017 until
23

van der Lijn, Jaïr, editor. Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019. 8, Accessed 22 Nov.. 2021.
24
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25
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June 2020.27 Later in the cooperation, parts of MINUSMA collaborated with JF-G5S in
intelligence gathering and information sharing. This intelligence collaboration shows the extent
to which MINUSMA and the JF-G5S were working together. Because of their close
collaboration, it is difficult for the local populations to discern what actions are conducted by
MINUSMA and which ones are conducted by the JF-G5S. Therefore, when the JF-G5S takes
sides and is partial to conflict to meet its own goals, it reflects badly upon MINUSMA,
especially with regards to impartiality.
The JF-G5S were supposed to conduct counterterrorism operations while MINUSMA
could focus on protection of civilians. However, the collaboration created an impossible paradox,
as MINUSMA is no longer able to solely return to political tasks, as it “may risk further
destabilization of the country and potentially the whole Sahel-West African region.” 28 At the
same time, working with the JF-G5S sullies MINUSMA’s reputation and makes its job more
difficult as civilians no longer trust the mission to protect them because of its fraught history
with local militias. The JF-G5S essentially subcontracts the militias so that they work in
conjunction with the multilateral force to fight terrorist groups in the region. This collaboration
has been documented as unpopular by large surveys of the population, which I will discuss in
detail in the next section. Because there is also an ethnic conflict in northern Mali between these
various ethnic militias, when the JF-G5S works with a militia for counterterrorism purposes,
many view that collaboration as the JF-G5S picking sides.
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Why the JF-G5S has made MINUSMA’s job more difficult:
While the JF-G5S should, in theory, make MINUSMA’s job easier as it provides more
stability in the area, that has not been the case because the counter-terrorism efforts have “fueled
local conflicts,”29 and eroded MINUSMA’s reputation of impartiality. The JF-G5S itself has a
“poor human rights and governance record” and has used “ethnic proxy militias who are
responsible for committing atrocities against the civilian population.”30 Niger and its forces,
specifically, use Tuareg and Doosaak militias to combat jihadist groups.31 These militias were
created out of self-defense against these jihadist groups, and have been involved in cycles of
intercommunal violence, significantly resulting in 40 killed in May 2016 with ethnic violence
between the Bambara and Fulani militias,32 and the 23 March 2019 Ogossagou massacre, which
killed 160 Fulani people.33 These massacres, involvement in intercommunal violence, and usage
of ethnic militias directly involved the JF-G5S in the conflict. Because MINUSMA has worked
so closely with the JF-G5S, it is also involved in the conflict by proxy, or, at the very least, it is
viewed by local populations to be involved. This involvement erodes the mission’s impartiality
as it is seen as being party to the conflict and, therefore, can not be an unprejudiced bystander
and peace-enforcer.
Moreover, The JF-G5S and French military operations have also ostracized the Tuareg
population, as there is a sentiment that these militaries see all Tuaregs as supporting the rebel
group, MNLA, when this is not the case.34 This also reflects poorly on MINUSMA as the
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mission is considered to have a preconceived view of local populations, and, therefore, can not
be neutral. Consequently, the JF-G5S is a horrendous partner for MINUSMA as it further
endangers the civilians that MINUSMA was mandated to protect. The counterterrorism efforts
have been especially harmful in ethnic conflicts in northern Mali.
Furthermore, multilateral state actors like the US, NATO, or the EU often see the conflict
through a narrow lens, characterized by the ‘war on terror.’ Dennis Jett’s description of UN
Missions failing due to the priorities of wealthy Western Democracies can be seen here. These
countries usually work towards peace only so that they can ensure their own national security
and economic interests, rather than protecting Sahelian citizens. For example, French Operation
Serval (January 2013 - July 2014) was, and, later, Operation Barkhane (August 2014 - Present
day) is fully focused on counterterrorism. The French intervention, while it was supported by the
UN, was meant to prevent Mali from becoming a safe haven for terrorist organizations,
especially those who might target France and Europe. Therefore, these Western-backed
counterterrorism containment strategies “[undermine and challenge] any sort of thinking about
the ‘root causes of conflict.’” Because these forces are so singularly focused on counterterrorism
and national security, they “[create] little to no incentive to debate the forms that Malian peace,
state sovereignty, and nation should take. Under conditions of regional counterterrorism war, the
bases of legitimate state violence and authority are shifting, increasingly unstable, contested, and
not where they are supposed to be.”35
The convoluted security issues in Mali and the UN’s failed multilateral response have
made MINUSMA the “deadliest of all current UN peace operations.” The question is still being
asked as to whether or not MINUSMA should have a renewed mandate so that they have the
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purview to fight terrorists, or whether counterterrorism is beyond the scope and capabilities that
UN missions can realistically face.36

MINUSMA’s Failures:
The joining of the JF-G5S has led to MINUSMA’s failure. As I’ve mentioned, because
Western actors were more concerned with their own national security interests than establishing a
peace agreement between the warring factions, MINUSMA is potentially a failed mission. With
the French interventions and the JF-G5S, the international support in Mali has been primarily
focused on counterterrorism. Instead of focusing solely on peacekeeping, the mission has
become directly involved in the conflict because it collaborated with the JF-G5S, which has led
to local populations considering the mission as partial and biased.
Since the collaboration between MINUSMA and multilateral counterterrorism operations
set a precedent, the UN took a “discursive turn towards stabilization, counterinsurgency, and
counterterrorism in the debate on how UN peacekeeping should be reformed to be relevant to
future needs of member states.”37 In particular, Western and African states have stressed that UN
PKOs should break from the fundamental assumption of impartiality, and instead turn towards
stability and counterterrorism. These nations have used MINUSMA as an example in support of
this vision, citing the challenges that MINUSMA specifically faces. However, this is an
impossible direction to take. Part of what makes UN peacekeeping missions successful is that
they are impartial. Impartiality is vital to gaining the trust of civilians in the affected state so that
the UN can work closely with locals to ensure civilian protection. Furthermore, UN missions
have been unpopular not only for joining with outside forces but also because “blue helmets are
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deemed unable to prevent massacres or protect victims and are suspected of spreading
diseases.”38
The widespread decrease of MINUSMA’s legitimacy and credibility are well
documented. Every year the Mali Metre Survey is conducted and it has recently documented
public outrage of the mission. This outrage is exacerbated by the fact that few Malians know
what the mandated goals of the mission are; 24.7% of the respondents to the 2018 survey
mention MINUSMA’s failure to combat Islamic militants in the region, even though
counterterrorism was never a mandated goal of MINUSMA.39 The mission’s main goal is to
support the implementation of the Algiers Agreement. This goal has been communicated
ineffectively, and further muddled by the cooperation of MINUSMA with counterterrorism
operations. In addition, because of the various complexities added with the JF-G5S, 33.7% of the
respondents of the survey “criticized MINUSMA for being an accomplice to armed groups.” 40
This criticism could be due to general malice towards the ethnic militias and their
inter-communal conflicts, but the negative public opinion is most likely aggravated by the 2016
intercommunal violence that killed 40 people.
MINUSMA has also failed in supporting the implementation of the Algiers Agreement.
Because MINUSMA was entrusted with mediating the peace process and ensuring the
implementation of the result, the mission needs to interact with all signatories. Some groups and
civilians have shown outrage at the mission's interaction with violent groups as they “see such
interaction as condoning the actions of those groups,”41 which is a direct result of MINUSMA’s
close collaboration with the JF-G5S. In essence, many Malians see MINUSMA as a mission that
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picks sides and is privy to violent armed groups, working with them. The negative perceptions of
MINUSMA by Malians hinder MINUSMA’s ability to be an impartial actor who can implement
peace agreements, protect civilians, and apply pressure on various groups so that they institute
reforms.
Overall, MINUSMA’s credibility and legitimacy have been highly dependent on the
ability of the mission to help stabilize Mali and continue peace reforms. Because MINUSMA
partnered with the JF-G5S, which has an unfavorable record of working with armed groups and
protecting human rights, the authority of MINUSMA to enforce peace agreements and protect
civilians as an neutral observer has been greatly harmed because they have lost the trust of local
civilian populations due to their reputation as a partial actor within the conflict. This has been
shown again by the Mali Metre surveys: “Overall, 59% of the respondents to the 2018 Mali
Metre survey do not think the Mission is effective when it comes to protecting the Malian
population against the violence of armed and terrorist groups, which has been the main point of
criticism since 2016.”42
The Mali Metre polls show that public opinion of MINUSMA dropped considerably
during the time in which it partnered with the JF-G5S. For example, in 2015, respondents said
that “MINUSMA was about the protection of civilians (70%).” 43 This fell in 2019 when only
17.5% of the respondents said they knew MINUSMA’s renewed mandate was for the protection
of the population.”44 The drop could be in response to the Ogossagou massacre in early 2019.
The main criticism stayed the same: in 2015, 51.8% of those surveyed criticized the mission for
“not protecting the populations against the violence of armed groups and terrorists,”45 which was
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the same in 2019, with 54.1% of respondents voicing this same critique. More alarming is the
other criticisms. In 2015, 39.1% denounced MINUSMA for “being an accomplice of armed
groups,” followed by other criticisms, like “contribute to the high cost of living (23.8%),” “A
mandate that is not sufficiently known (27.7%),” and “respond very slowly to the challenges of
stabilization of the country (20.1%).”46
The negative views observed in Mali Metre escalated after the joining of MINUSMA and
the JF-G5S. While the two most common critiques are the same, the less prominent ones are
more negative. For example, in 2019, 77.9% of the respondents said they were not satisfied with
the work of MINUSMA, with 60.3% saying they were “very dissatisfied and 17.6% saying they
were somewhat dissatisfied.47 Only 2% said they were very satisfied. Moreover, the surveyed
citizens complained that MINUSMA did not protect the people against the violence of armed
groups and terrorists (54.1%), that MINUSMA is an accomplice of armed groups (34.4%), that
the mission only protects itself (25.2%), and that they are in Mali for its own benefit (20%). 43%
also said that the mission “must leave Mali.”48
While public opinion polls only paint one portion of a complicated picture, they show an
important trend, namely that MINUSMA is hated by the Malian people. While MINUSMA has
faced some successes -- MINUSMA oversaw the presidential elections, which were “generally
deemed to be free and fair, and held under calm conditions, with no major security incident
reported. Approximately 48% of registered voters participated in the elections, the highest
turnout in Mali since 2002”49 -- the goal of the mission to protect civilians has been unmet.
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Because MINUSMA was created post-Brahimi report, the mission has increasingly
expanded its mandated goals and rules of engagement to account for counterterrorism threats and
the emphasis of counterterrorism by wealthy Western Democracies. At the beginning of
MINUSMA’s mandate, its goals were stabilization, promotion of electoral reforms and processes,
protection of civilians and UN personnel, promotion of human rights, supporting humanitarian
assistance, supporting cultural preservation, and supporting national and international justice.50
These goals have become more difficult to accomplish as the mission has worked more with
attempting to stabilize the country than keeping peace. As the mission has ventured more
towards using military force to stabilize the country, including assisting the JF-G5S, the
reputation of the mission has been greatly harmed, creating an environment in which the very
same people who are supposed to help protect civilians are not trusted, and actively despised.
MINUSMA’s collaboration with various military forces and its large goals have doomed the
mission to failure. The JF-G5S military forces have bad track records and create a reputation of
partiality for the mission, which then hinders its ability to protect civilians. Moreover, rather than
enforcing the peace agreement in a small area, because MINUSMA has so many goals, such
goals can, at times, contradict one another, making the mission face multiple impossible tasks. In
essence, by engaging in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, MINUSMA was doomed to fail
as it could not both engage in stabilization while still being an impartial and trustworthy actor in
its work to enforce peace agreements and protect civilians

UNSMIL
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was formed in response to
the Libyan Civil War and relied on NATO and the EU to provide military force to ensure stability
50
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and civilian protection. These forces were provided on the basis of the R2P (Responsibility to
Protect Doctrine). While these forces were effective in the First Civil War, NATO and the EU
failed to provide any military force during the Second Civil War, essentially dismantling
UNSMIL, which was structured to rely on these forces. The institutional incentives of NATO and
the EU did not match those of UNSMIL, sinking the mission and harming the R2P Doctrine.

Background:
The Libyan Civil War began in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring. Anti-Qadhafi Protesters
clashed with security forces on February 15th, 2011, which eventually led to a war between pro
and anti-Qadhafi forces. The UN first took rudimentary actions, freezing Quadafi’s assets on
February 26th because he repressed civilians. Later, after the protests devolved into a widespread
uprising, a multilateral military force was created to protect Libyan civilians, and UNSMIL was
established to help with a political transition after Quadafi’s death and the rebel groups’ victory
in the war. However, despite the international intervention, factional violence continued and
eventually led to a Second Civil War in 2014.
The UNSC passed Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, “which gave authorization to use
‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. Thereafter, a US-led
multinational coalition launched Operation Odyssey Dawn.”51 Resolution 1973 uses the R2P
doctrine to ask UN member states to protect Libyan civilians. It was enacted due to the violence
of Quadafi’s forces. Operation Odyssey Dawn was created to provide support to Anti-Quadafi
forces, at the very beginning of the Civil war, from March 13-31 2011.52 During this time, the US
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established an UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Libya and conducted airstrikes on various Libyan
weapon assets, including anti-aircraft artillery and tanks. Later, on March 23rd the US military
began to transfer authority to a NATO force, called Operation Unified Protector, which upheld
the no-fly zone and ended with the ending of the war in October 2011.53 The US involvement
was harmonious with its larger goals of counterterrorism and stability.
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Libya was formed on September 16, 2011, in
response to the ending of the First Libyan Civil War. Because UNSMIL is a political assistance
and support mission, rather than a PKO, the goals of UNSMIL mainly focused on assisting a
political transition from Quadafi to democracy, rather than purely focusing on civilian protection.
UNSMIL’s specific mandated goals were: to restore public security and promote the rule of law,
undertake political dialogue including all actors, promote human rights, initiate economic
recovery, and coordinate support from multilateral actors.54
Moreover, in January 2012, to further support multilateral stabilization efforts, the UN
deployed its Security Sector Reform (SSR) unit. This unit was intended to support the
UNSMIL’s goal of coordinating international assistance and peacekeeping. Security sector
reform is a niche part of the UN’s peacekeeping and assistance operations. The UN believes that
“Delivering security to its people is the sovereign right and responsibility of any government,”55
but also understands that many transitioning governments do not have the necessary bureaucratic
infrastructure to provide this security, like a functioning police force. By supplying a SSR Unit,
the UN wanted to stabilize the region so that UNSMIL could achieve “constitutional, judicial,
electoral, and social security progress.”56 The UN firmly believes that SSR is not only essential
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for helping protect civilians but is an integral part of developmental goals. UNSMIL is
substantially smaller than the mission in Mali, with 233 troops, compared to Mali’s 13,000, but
they have SSR units to aid in upholding ceasefire agreements and implementing defense
provisions. Both missions face similar problems, as Western nations have prioritized ensuring
their own national security interests are met, with less emphasis on aiming for the benefit of the
country their forces are stationed in. In UNSMIL, the SSR unit is especially significant as it
encompasses more of the mission because of the mission’s small size.
While UNSMIL and MINUSMA are structured very differently, they share the “objective
to help restore state authority across national territory. As of 2019, the mandates of both
UNSMIL and MINUSMA explicitly frame this objective in terms of stabilization, or support
thereof.”57 What this means in practice is that UNSMIL faces a similar issue to MINUSMA
where it is seen by locals as “pretending impartiality while in reality flanking the government
and promoting its agenda.”58 Essentially, the goals of stabilization and security are not the issues.
The issues that plague both UNSMIL and MINUSMA are the actions that military forces do or
do not take in the name of stabilization and security. UNSMIL’s structure and reliance on NATO
and EU military forces made the mission vulnerable to being left without necessary resources.
Consequently, UNSMIL is dealing with the consequences of its structural failures after these
wealthy Western democracies pulled their forces after the costs of intervention outweighed the
benefits of providing security and stability to Libya.
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How International Forces Failed to Help UNSMIL:
The international military intervention did not succeed in stabilizing Libya, as there was a
second civil war only a few years after the first. The start of the Second Libyan Civil War in
2014 showed that UNSMIL had failed in its goals of restoring public security and creating a
dialogue between all factions. UNSMIL’s failure was linked to military intervention, as the
mission relied only on international actors to provide military deterrence to armed groups. The
236 people at UNSMIL include 233 troops, and 3 experts on the mission. 59 The small number of
soldiers were clearly not enough to provide a substantial deterrent to factional violence, which is
why the UN relied on international intervention for stability, rather than its own troops, leading
to its structural problems with competing incentives for intervention. The UN was not in favor
of deploying its troops because they believed that NATO forces had more capacity to protect
civilians, with the backing of R2P.
While MINUSMA faced issues because it collaborated with international forces and
gained an unfavorable reputation because of those forces, UNSMIL’s main criticism is that the
mission did not do enough, echoing the widespread condemnation of UN missions in the 1990s.
NATO intervened militarily in 2011 and promptly left Libya without any real plan for
state-building. The EU later deployed its own forces, which would focus on border security and
monitoring immigration that was bleeding into European nations, but this force was less
influential than NATO’s forces. In both the NATO and the EU forces, the countries intervened
selfishly, trying to prevent an immigration crisis, rather than focusing on the longer-term goals of
state-building. The NATO and EU forces essentially aimed to create stabilization without the
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institutions, state-building, and infrastructure to support it. As a consequence, the stabilization
objectives failed, as Libya descended into the Second Civil War.
NATO’s withdrawal and subsequent power-vacuum were the biggest obstacles facing
UNSMIL. Critics of UNSMIL agreed that there were two obstacles to the UN’s SSR initiative:
“The first is that every time a major armed conflict burst out in the country
UNSMIL refuses to use military power, except once, in the beginning of the conflict...the
second obstacle is that the UNSC passed numerous resolutions and statements regarding
the SSR in Libya which cover almost every programme in the field of development and
security. This is due to the UN’s comprehensive approach.”60
The UN deployed UNSMIL with very specific goals of state-building and relied on
forces like NATO and the EUBAM (EU border force) for the military aspect of the mission.
When those forces pulled out of Libya, the UN was left with a very small mission and still
expected to accomplish lofty goals without the necessary military power.
Even with the NATO intervention, Western states were wary of intervening and
advocated that their role should be small, yet supportive of the Libyan-led transition. This
potentially explains why there was no intervention in the Second Civil War. Unlike MINUSMA
and the French support of international intervention, in Libya the fear of intervention was, in
part, in respect to Libyans, who Western diplomats feared were “hostile to outside interference in
their transition.”61 Primarily, the issue that international intervention brought UNSMIL was the
lack of long-sighted forethought and planning, which was a direct result of the competing
incentives in Libyan intervention between Western Democracies and the UN. While NATO and
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the EU were eager to intervene to promote human rights and prevent a large influx of immigrants
into Europe, the long-term state-building forces needed by UNSMIL were not provided.
UNSMIL relied on Western interventionary forces for its military needs but was left dry when
the immediate goals of these Western nations had been accomplished. The UN had designed
UNSMIL to be small, in part, because they had expected to rely on international intervention.
Because the new interim government was not able to control rebel groups, the rhetorical
commitments of NATO and the EU failed to manifest concretely. Therefore, state-building and
democratization processes halted.62 UNSMIL was left with a gordian-knot of a task:
state-building without the military power needed to do so.

UNSMIL’s Failures and Successes:
While UNSMIL has some small successes, 63 for the most part, in the aftermath of the
international intervention, the mission was a failure. The collaboration with NATO and
subsequent power vacuum created a fragile, unstable nation with a transitional government
hindered by the authoritarian history of Libya and the lack of civil society. In 2014, the security
situation, which UNSMIL was supposed to help improve, had deteriorated so much that “the UN
decided to evacuate all its international personnel to Tunisia.”64 Because UNSMIL did not have
the capacity to stabilize Libya with a mission force of just over 200 personnel, and the
international forces had left without a plan to manage the weapons they had left behind, the
situation in 2014 worsened quickly.
Furthermore, Libyans themselves became more cynical about international intervention:
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“A survey of commentary on Facebook in response to joint Western
communiqués calling for political dialogue and an end to violence in the summer of 2014
reveals deep divisions in opinion about outside involvement. Some Libyan commentators
lament the inability of Western countries to stop the violence, and beg for more
engagement, while others blast the West for unwarranted interference in Libya’s internal
affairs”65
This shows a similar issue as that faced by MINUSMA where there is a lack of
communication of UNSMIL’s responsibilities. Because international intervention had dissipated
so quickly the prospect of intervention became unpopular as Libyans were not able to see how
previous interventions helped the situation -- in fact, because of the Second Civil War, the
interventions likely made the stability in the state worse.
Perhaps, most alarmingly, the biggest criticism of this international intervention in Libya
is how it eroded the R2P Doctrine. All the UNSC resolutions surrounding UNSMIL and military
intervention in Libya were “adopted on the premise that the international community has a moral
responsibility to protect civilians.”66 While NATO used R2P as a justification for intervening
during the First Libyan Civil War, the country faced very real and dangerous threats to its
existence in the Second as well, but no international military intervention was taken. Moreover,
“one of the biggest limitations of NATO's intervention is the lack of a post-conflict mission in
Libya, which is in contrast with the original formulation of the R2P concept.” 67 The international
intervention is also seen as harmful to R2P because Libya after the intervention was “swiftly
moving towards renewed conflict and chaos and the UNSMIL encountered continued obstruction
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and frustration, neither the UN nor the powers that had intervened in Libya in 2011 were ready
or willing to fulfill their moral responsibility and reconsider the developing situation in light of
post-revolt realities.”68 Essentially, the inconsistency of military intervention when applying the
R2P doctrine risked invalidating the entirety of the doctrine altogether.
UNSMIL recently has been somewhat more successful, in part because it no longer uses
international forces like NATO to conduct stabilization. The mission has been more focused on
enforcing a ceasefire and coordinating peace talks and aid than stabilization. The Second Civil
War lasted from 2014-2020, it ended when a ceasefire was negotiated between the Libyan army
and warring rebel groups. In the short-term aftermath of the international intervention, ceasefires
were unsuccessful, including the Skhirat agreement, which was signed by all actors in the
conflict. While this agreement was substantial, it was declared void by General Khalifa Haftar of
the Libyan National Army, a major actor in the conflict, in 2017. Various ceasefires, conferences,
and agreements ensued between the various groups, but the 2019 Salamé three-point peace plan
is the current one that has a chance of fully ending the conflict. The first part of the three-point
plan is the ceasefire, then a meeting of all international actors who have been involved in Libya,
and then the last part is a discussion between influential people across Libya.69 Currently, Libya
is planning on holding elections in June 2022. The elections were postponed from December
2018 to December 2021, and again to June. The full failure or success of UNSMIL will be seen
in the aftermath of these elections.
UNSMIL, in a way, faces the exact opposite issue of MINUSMA, but they both stem
from the same overarching problems. In MINUSMA, Western and African countries pushed the
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mission towards including counterterrorism in its mandate. France and the G5S were active in
encouraging counterterrorism because combatting AQIM, among others, was important to their
national security interests. With UNSMIL, NATO and the EU intervened in Libya because it was
prudent to their own national security interests. Jumping on the political opportunity provided by
the 2011 protests and subsequent uprising, NATO decided to intervene for a plethora of reasons:
many nations cited the R2P doctrine (responsibility to protect) and the need for countries to
protect Libyans against Qadhafi’s onslaught. However, these decisions were also influenced by
Qadhafi’s intense authoritarianism and constant anti-Western rhetoric.
With MINUSMA, the JF-G5S is a corrupt force that faces many issues because of its
misconduct. In other words, MINUSMA’s collaboration with the JF-G5S was detrimental
because MINUSMA was trying to accomplish too much, in terms of stabilization. With
UNSMIL, the forces themselves were effective when they intervened, but they pulled out too
quickly, leading to an absolute collapse in 2014. In this case, UNSMIL was also trying to
accomplish too much but simply did not have the resources, rather than having tainted resources.
Moreover, UNSMIL later developed the same issues as MINUSMA as “international actors often
hired these very militias [Libyan rebel militias] to provide security.”70 The hiring of these militias
emboldened them and later led to further state fragmentation.

UNAMA
During the UN’s involvement in Afghanistan, the mission faced intense contention with
wealthy Western democracies as these countries and the UN worked to further their own goals
within Afghanistan. Through the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
the UN worked with these countries to provide the military power necessary to enforce peace
70
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agreements and ensure stability. However, because the UN and each country involved in the
ISAF had conflicting incentives, UNAMA’s failure was characterized by disorganized,
competing and fragmented efforts to stabilize and build democracy in Afghanistan.

Background:
The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by
UNSC Resolution 1401 on March 28, 2002, to help implement the Bonn agreement. The Bonn
agreement was a peace talk process by different factions of the Afghanistan conflict with the goal
of creating permanent government institutions. The Bonn Agreement created a five-step process
that worked to create an Interim Authority, a Transitional Administration, an emergency Loya
Jirga (an assembly of leaders), and to ask for international assistance in training new Afghan
Security forces.71 The Interim Authority was asked to act as the government of Afghanistan, with
Hamid Karzai chosen to be the chairman of the Afghanistan Interim Authority and sworn in on
December 22, 2015. Later, there was an emergency Loya Jira, which is a large legal assembly of
Afghan leaders who were tasked with choosing a new President of Afghanistan and cabinet
members of the Transitional Administration, on June 11, 2002. Karzai was, again, chosen as the
leader of the Transitional Administration during this assembly.
UNAMA was tasked with helping institute the Bonn Agreement, by the “development of
a sustainable nationwide political system; and relief, recovery and reconstruction work aiming to
address both short-term humanitarian needs and long-term socioeconomic development.”72 In
essence, UNAMA was tasked with the same coordination of international forces and
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international aid as UNSMIL was. The mission acted as the “primary coordinating mechanism
for the targeting and distribution of international aid to Afghanistan,” 73 which became
substantially more difficult as the US occupation of Afghanistan drew on.
UNAMA faced the same structural issues as UNSMIL and MINUSMA, as it was tasked
with providing stabilization to a very complicated nation in conflict. The Secretary General’s
2002 Report on the security situation of Afghanistan laid out the mandated goals; UNAMA was
responsible for ensuring the Bonn Agreement was being followed, especially concerning gender
issues and human rights. The mission also was mandated to promote “national reconciliation and
rapprochement throughout the country” and to manage “all United Nations humanitarian relief,
recovery and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.” 74
Furthermore, in managing humanitarian relief and stability in the region, UNAMA, from
its creation in 2002, worked with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF
was created by UNSC Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001, and was intended to help assist in
the implementation of the Bonn Agreement by working with the Afghanistan Interim Authority
to create a stable environment in which the UN and Afghanistan Interim Authority could conduct
business safely. About half of the ISAF troops were contributed by the US, even though the US
did not support the formation of the ISAF at the time.75
Because the creation of UNAMA was in response to the US’s invasion of Afghanistan,
there was a consensus at the start of the mission “that a more limited force should be deployed, at
a minimum, to help maintain order in Kabul and support the new Afghan Government.” 76
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UNAMA was also created as a smaller mission as they believed having a “light footprint” by
international forces would help foster Afghan sovereignty and ensure that the peacebuilding
processes would be locally led.77 This idea of a smaller mission was, again, due to the failures of
UN peacekeeping in places like East Timor (9,000 troops) and Bosnia (60,000 troops), where
having more boots on the ground did not equate to stopping ethnic cleansing and civilian
deaths.78
The ISAF, at least at the beginning of the conflict, was successful in contributing to the
stability in Kabul, and the force had established a good relationship with the Transitional
Administration. Moreover, ISAF worked in conjunction with the Afghanistan Interim Authority
in providing a secure environment for the Loya Jirga in 2002. In addition, the ISAF did great
work in confiscating weapons, including over 175,000 unguided missiles, mines, and anti-tank
and anti-aircraft missiles.79 Perhaps more importantly, the ISAF was successful in creating a
good relationship with the local population during this time as well, with 78% of Afghans
supporting the US and international forces in 2005.80

How ISAF Made UNAMA’s Job More Difficult:
The US’s invasion of Afghanistan and UNAMA’s interaction with US forces fatally
flawed the mission from its conception. For example, the Bonn Agreement, which UNAMA was
supposed to enforce, left out key actors in the conflict in Afghanistan. For example, the Taliban,
Hezb-eIslami Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani Network were all excluded from the Bonn Agreement
77
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negotiations. This is likely because, in the aftermath of 9/11, to include these groups, which the
UN categorized as “terrorists” was unthinkable.81 Moreover, similarly to UNSMIL, the US forces
and the ISAF did not focus on long-term development. These clashing focuses are emblematic of
the direct tension between the UN and Western governments during the intervention in
Afghanistan. This tension would, ultimately, lead to the downfall of UNAMA.
Even though the first years of UNAMA and ISAF were characterized by successful
stabilization, as the mission continued, issues arose. For example, the Northern Alliance leaders
were against a peacekeeping force,82 and collaboration with the ISAF eroded the relationship
between UNAMA and some signatories of the Bonn Agreement. Moreover, ISAF started to clash
with the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency aims of Operation Enduring Freedom, a US
military operation. This disagreement led to further strain with UNAMA, as one of the mission’s
mandated goals was coordinating military efforts. However, without a singular military voice due
to the international nature of the ISAF and the many militaries conducting operations in
Afghanistan, the disagreement made UNAMA’s ability to complete its mandated goals more
difficult.83 Moreover, the ISAF had a fraught relationship with UNAMA as they criticized the
mission as being “too weak to deliver on the civilian side of counterinsurgency,” to which
UNAMA responded that ISAF did not understand the mission and its capabilities. 84 The tension
between the ISAF and UNAMA is significant because they were created to work in conjunction
with each other in stabilizing the country and overseeing peace processes. The tension and
subsequent lack of coordination made UNAMA’s job all the more difficult.
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Consequently, UNAMA faced many of the same implications as UNSMIL and
MINUSMA. The objectives of the US and its allies were often at odds with UN objectives. Thus,
there was intense internal conflict within ISAF. The ISAF was more focused on
counterinsurgency and supporting the new Afghan government, while Operation Enduring
Freedom was solely focused on counterterrorism and driving Al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan. 85 The
conflict between Operation Enduring Freedom and the ISAF often made UNAMA’s job more
difficult, as the mission was supposed to be the coordinating voice for military operations.86 The
US during this time was intensely focused on counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan and
framed the entire occupation as part of its ‘war on terror.’ As the US’s Operation Enduring
Freedom focused primarily on destroying the al-Qaeda safe haven, the US lumped the Taliban
into the same enemy category. This categorizing was at odds with the state-building UNAMA
mission because the US was deeply against including what it categorized as “terrorists” in the
peace process. The US’s short-sighted mission to oust al-Qaeda from Afghanistan directly
opposed the UN’s long-term goals of peacemaking and development. This disagreement
manifested in the aftermath of the Bonn Agreement implementation; the US did not further
support the reconciliation agenda, which then led to the UN facing major challenges. The
disjointed nature of the US, UN, and ISAF led to “one group chasing the Taliban and another
inviting them for talks.”87
The disjointed nature of UNAMA, ISAF and the US further supports my argument that
the current structure of these large-reaching UN missions dooms them to failure. UNAMA did
not have the resources within its mission to conduct stability operations, coordinate humanitarian
aid, and encourage the economic development of Afghanistan. Therefore, the mission needed to
85
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rely on these large, mainly Western counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. These
operations, however, had their own agendas to eradicate al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. To do this,
NATO and the US vilified the Taliban, which, in turn, made UNAMA’s ability to bring them to
the table for peace talks near impossible.

UNAMA’s Failures:
Although UNAMA was successful in its elementary years in implementing the Bonn
Agreement, as the occupation of Afghanistan drew on, UNAMA became less successful. The
Afghan support of US and International Forces fell from 2005 to 2009. More importantly, the
local confidence in the rights of women, security from crime and violence, and overall conditions
fell from about 71%, 72%, and 83%, respectively, in 2005 to 52%, 57%, and 69% in 2009.88
Civilian casualties and injuries rose substantially between 2009 and 2015, not to mention
the eventual fall of the Afghan government entirely and the reemergence of the Taliban in 2021. 89
Furthermore, civilian population confidence in the direction of Afghanistan fell dramatically as
well during UNAMA’s tenure, with 61% of the population feeling pessimistic for Afghanistan’s
future, 70% citing security as the main reason for this cynicism.90 Since 2006, the amount of
Afghans who responded that they fear for their own safety has risen by 31%.91 Even though
UNAMA is not a peacekeeping operation, the goals of the mission centered around national
recovery, human rights, and humanitarian relief allocation. These goals were not met, or, at least,
perceived to be unmet as citizens feel more insecure financially and physically now than at the
88
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beginning of UNAMA’s tenure. This is mainly due to the conflict in Afghanistan, to which the
ISAF was party.
I argue that UNAMA has failed as it was unable to successfully implement the Bonn
Agreement, as the Taliban now rule the country. UNAMA’s support of the Bonn Agreement was
supposed to ensure that Afghanistan had a strong, popular government in the aftermath of the
Taliban’s control. UNAMA also was unable to ensure the security of the nation, and coordinate
humanitarian aid so that the Transitional Authority and government thereafter would have the
tools necessary to provide livelihoods for their citizens. This has not been the case. In the
aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, not only did the Taliban take control of Afghanistan as
soon as US forces left, but girls now face an increased risk of child marriage,92 there are reports
of the Taliban conducting extra-judicial killings,93 and there is still a general lack of inclusivity
and disregard of human rights from the current Taliban government. Overall, UNAMA was
created to help create a new sustainable government. With the takeover of the Taliban in 2021
and the humanitarian crisis that ensued, UNAMA failed at state-building, stabilization, and
socio-economic development.

MONUSCO
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO) was founded with two overarching goals: stability and protection of
civilians. However, unlike the previous missions, in order to accomplish this goal, the UN
decided to equip the mission with a military force, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). While
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having a military force unified within the mission might seem beneficial, it brought MONUSCO
closer to the conflict. Because of the FIB and its methods, MONUSCO was directly involved in
ethnic conflicts, eroding its ability to help protect civilians and be an impartial moderator for
peace. Thus, the collaboration with military force, through the DRC’s army and the FIB
complicates MONUSCO’s ability to accomplish its mandated goals.

Background:
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO) has the most history of any of these four case studies. MONUSCO was
originally formed as the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s to permit
the full withdrawal of Belgium forces from the Congo in the aftermath of the Congo crisis. The
Congo Crisis was a period of political upheaval from 1960 to 1965 that was sparked by a
Congolese nationalist movement pushing for Belgian withdrawal. The withdrawal of Belgian
troops from the Congo started in 1960 and all the Belgium troops were withdrawn by 1964. After
the withdrawal of Belgian troops in 1960, a mutiny of black soldiers broke out against their
white officers, which led to inter-communal fighting between white and black residents of
Léopoldville (now Kinshasa). After various other instances of violence, including a hostage
situation involving the Simbas, a Maoist group, and hostages from the local white population, the
US and Belgium intervened in March 1965. After some stability, in November 1965, there was a
coup d’etat and Mobutu Sese Seko took control of the Congo, later renamed Zaire, from 1965
until 1997. In the 32 years that Mobutu was in power, the UN mission was dormant. Mobutu was
a ruthless and corrupt dictator, but, as a result, the was less opportunity for dissent, conflict, and
international intervention.
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Shortly preceding Mobutu’s death, the First Congo War broke out between the Allied
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) (and its allies, including the US,
Rwanda, Uganda, and South Africa), and the government of Zaire (and its allies, including
France, China, Israel, Sudan, Chad and the Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamist group). 94 This
war was, in part, fueled by the Rwandan genocide and mass exodus of refugees into Zaire and
neighboring countries.95 The war ended with an AFDL victory and the installment of
Laurent-Désiré Kabila as President. The First Congo War was characterized by remaining
hostilities between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, fueled by remnants of the Rwandan
genocide, where around 700,000 Tutsis were killed.96
Less than a year after the First Congo War, the Second Congo War began fueled by
general disappointment with President Kabila. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi fought with the
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), a political group that operated in the eastern part of the
country. This war began in August 1998 and ended on July 18, 2003. The conflict included the
genocide of 60,000-100,000 of the Pygmy people and created long-lasting intercommunal
conflicts.
In 2000, the UN created the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) again as a response to the Second Congo War and the various
human rights threats that were occurring throughout the international conflict. MONUC was
renamed MONUSCO in 2010 to reflect the new stabilization aspect of the mission. As of 2020,
the mandate for MONUSCO states that the mission should have two goals, the protection of
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civilians, and the stabilization of the country, which includes security sector reforms and support
for public institutions and governance.97 With stabilization, MONUSCO is mandated to provide
military support, help with disarming militias, and provide security sector reform.98
The name change was in response to UNSC Resolution 1925, which was the specific
resolution that added ‘stabilization and peace consolidation’ to MONUSCO’s original mandate.
The revision of this mandate shows MONUSCO’s unique ability among missions to be
responsive to the constantly changing security situations on the ground.99 Moreover, the
reorganization of MONUSCO from MONUC is also emblematic of the UN’s shift from small,
local UN missions to these large, overreaching, stabilization missions in the aftermath of the
Brahimi Report. MONUC was supposed to be a small mission that was focused on the protection
of civilians, especially during the Second Congo War, while MONUSCO is the largest
peacekeeping operation in the UN’s history and is far-reaching, dealing with everything from
state building assistance and security sector reform to the protection of civilians in large conflicts
within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
MONUSCO faces many counterinsurgency and counterterrorism threats. Many armed
groups operate in the DRC, especially with the power vacuum that was created in the aftermath
of the Second War. Most notably, MONSUCO has dealt with the Ugandan Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF), the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)--who are remnants
of those who perpetrated the Rwandan genocide, and the March 23rd Movement (M23). M23 is
also supported by Rwanda who supplies weapons. The M23 movement was, at one point, the
most dangerous threat to stability within the DRC, especially when they took control of Goma,
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the capital city of North Kivu. Throughout the 21st century, the various conflicts in the Congo
have been fueled by continued ethnic tensions with the Hutus and the Tutsis, as well as strife
with Congo’s neighbors.

Force Intervention Brigade and how it hurt MONUSCO:
In a similar vein to the other case studies, the Foreign Intervention Brigade (FIB) was
formed by the UNSC on March 28, 2013, with Resolution 2098.100 Unlike the other missions
I’ve studied and their respective military forces, the FIB is integrated within MONUSCO, as a
peacekeeping unit specifically dedicated to neutralizing armed groups.101 Troops were deployed
to the eastern DRC, which had continued to suffer from conflicts and violence, especially in the
aftermath of M23’s capture of Goma. The UNSC hoped that by deploying the FIB, it would be
able to combat armed groups militarily, which would, in turn, compel them to accept peace.102
The FIB was successful in pushing the insurgents out of Goma and the Kivu provinces, shortly
after its formation in 2013. Both MONUSCO and the DRC’s President Joseph Kabila voiced that
they would like to continue the campaign against insurgency groups and turn their focus on
targeting the ADF and the FDLR in 2013. Unfortunately, the FIB did not meet the expectations
in continuing to fight these armed groups, even though the FDLR and ADF were notorious for
committing atrocities and human rights abuses. Instead of fighting the insurgency groups
head-on as they had promised, the FIB and MONUSCO changed course and supported the
DRC’s army’s (FARDC) offensive against the FDLR and the ADF, which would prove to be
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problematic.103 The collaboration with FARDC was a result of stabilization and state-building
efforts, but shows the competing incentives within the mission and the surrounding military
forces. The FARDC is part of the conflict, so the collaboration of the army with the FIB involves
all the UN’s efforts in Congo in the conflict.
MONUSCO is also unique because of its relationship with intelligence. MONUSCO has
used intelligence intensively in the neutralization of illegal armed groups and in helping the
Congolese government in stabilization efforts. MONUSCO used human intelligence, imagery,
and open sources, and through such intel, the mission was able to help the FIB in targeting
individuals, researching areas of operation, assessing risk, and recommending actions, among
other things.104 This intelligence gathering has, in a way, implicated MONUSCO in acting as a
party to armed conflict.105 Many of the conflicts that rage in eastern DRC are linked to ethnic
militias, often supported by Rwanda or Uganda. By targeting groups like the ADF and the
FDLR, the mission and the FIB are becoming parties to armed conflict as they intervene with
these armed militias and collaborate with the DRC’s army.

MONUSCO’s Failures:
As a peacekeeping force, MONUSCO faces a very similar dilemma as MINUSMA where
it is charged with both stabilization and protection of civilians. These two goals have run counter
to one another. To substantially protect civilians, one of its mandated goals, MONUSCO has to
maintain a reputation of impartiality. However, MONUSCO needed to work with the FIB in
order to create an environment in which peacekeepers could successfully conduct their mission,
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which would fulfill the other goal of impartiality. The mission is very forthright with its
condemnation of certain parties to the armed conflict. For example, MONUSCO views the
FDLR as a “‘spoiler’ whose members must be disarmed...the FDLR leaders don't have a
peaceful prospect. They survive on the backs of defenseless citizens and rob Congo of its
resources.’”106 MONUSCO, moreover, does not have a clean record itself as it works in
conjunction with the FARDC, “an army that is responsible for war crimes. MONUSCO is
thereby compromising its own neutrality and potentially, by extension, its ability to fulfill its
mandate to protect civilians.”107 The UNSC has explicitly condemned attacks against civilians,
including by “elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(FARDC).”108
In fact, since collaborating with the FARDC, the FIB has been ineffective in continuing
to protect civilians. In 2021, “at least 2024 civilians were killed by armed groups in North Kivu,
South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Ituri provinces. The majority of victims were in Ituri and North
Kivu, where inter-communal violence, as well as fighting between the FARDC and various
militias, escalated throughout 2021.”109 FIB partners with the FARDC, despite the fact that it is
itself a perpetrator in the killing of civilians. As a consequence, MONUSCO, by proxy of
collaborating with the FIB, is working with the same forces that are hindering the goal of
protecting civilians. The FARDC and DRC police forces have “also been implicated in
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including sexual
violence and arbitrarily killing civilians, while combatting armed groups.”110 For example, UN
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human rights investigators found FARDC troops arbitrarily killed 12 individuals, and conducted
around 70 rapes from the end of October until mid-December of 2009, thus working against the
protection of civilians before the creation of the FIB.111
The FARDC and its human rights abuses have continued even after the creation of the
FIB. In 2017, “seven Congolese army officers [were] arrested and charged with war crimes after
a video surfaced…that appeared to show uniformed soldiers opening fire on a group of civilians
in a massacre that left at least 13 people dead”112 in the Kasaï-Central Province. Furthermore, the
FARDC began an offensive against the ADF in October 2019. Since then, the ADF has “carried
out retaliatory violence against civilians…attacks that have been ‘systematic and brutal.’”113
Either by its own doing or via retaliatory violence, the FARDC has created more harm for
MONUSCO in its work to protect civilians. However, since MONUSCO houses the FIB, which
works to help the government stabilize the DRC by mitigating armed groups, MONUSCO must
work with the FARDC. In essence, the mission is stuck in a catch-22, where it must work with
the FARDC through the FIB to create the state-building that would promote long-term
stabilization, but in working with the FARDC they are hindering the mission’s ability to protect
civilians.
Furthermore, because MONUSCO collaborated with the FIB in its offensive against
M23, it can be argued that it is an actor in the conflict. Through the destruction of M23,
“MONUSCO’s impartiality [was] completely diminished.”114 This presents legal consequences
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for the future of UN PKOs. By directly stepping into armed conflict, MONUSCO peacekeepers
have lost their protected status, and the UN will have to plan for contingencies by which their
peacekeepers can feasibly be taken as prisoners of war.115
The FIB was unique because it was a dedicated armed force to act against militias in
Eastern Congo as a part of MONUSCO, rather than as an adjacent multilateral military
operation. What this means is MONUSCO is directly responsible for the ongoing activities of the
FIB. When the FIB collaborated with the FARDC, for example, the abuses of the FARDC
became directly related to MONUSCO because the FIB is a part of the mission. Therefore, the
negative ways in which military forces conduct their operations within the DRC allow other
armed groups and militias to capture peacekeepers as prisoners of war. This detrimental scenario
is playing out in real-time. After the FIB was created, M23 began to target the peacekeeping
forces directly. This is the direct result of the tarnished reputation of the UN as a third-party
civilian protection force, as it is now being seen as a party to the armed conflict as a whole.116
The erosion of the UN as a third-party civilian protection force is consequential for the
UN missions’ legal futures. Because the FIB is a party to the armed conflict in eastern DRC, the
armed groups and militias are justified in taking prisoners of war. Peacekeepers have previously
held international protection because they are supposed to be third-party observers solely focused
on the protection of civilians. MONUSCO is the first mission to have a dedicated force within
the mission singularly focused on neutralizing armed groups. The creation of a FIB inside
MONUSCO has created detrimental ramifications to the impartiality of the UN.
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Conclusion:
Each of the individual cases I have studied has failed at accomplishing its mandated goals
because of its cooperation with military forces in the name of stability. For the assistance
missions, UNSMIL and UNAMA, the international forces were deployed to accomplish the
counterterrorism objectives of the Western democracies which backed the forces. The UN
missions worked with these forces to try and create some semblance of balance and cooperation
of the intergovernmental organizations within these unstable states. In MINUSMA and
MONUSCO, the PKOs cooperated with military forces to try and stabilize their respective
nations.
When these missions began to use military force in their conflicts, the locals started to
view the missions as being party to the armed conflict and biased to one side or the other. The
perceived partiality of these missions hindered their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations,
as they lost the trust of wide sections of their respective societies. In Mali, after MINUSMA
began to cooperate with the JF-G5S, their popularity fell; many Malians reported that they were
dissatisfied with the work of the mission. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONSCO’s
Force Intervention Brigade (the military force that was created within MONUSCO to help
mitigate armed groups and establish stability), collaborated with the DRC’s military, the FARDC.
The FARDC’s bad human rights record, as well as the retaliation against civilians by some of the
extremist groups which the FIB and FARDC fight, created an environment in which MONUSCO
was collaborating with the very people it condemned. In Afghanistan, the UN’s efforts were
obstructed by the goals of the US military and the International Security Assistance Force. The
military forces began fighting various factions of the conflict in Afghanistan, the same factions
with which UNAMA was trying to negotiate peace deals.
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While the collaboration of these missions with military forces has been detrimental for
the missions, the fading line between peacekeeping, assistance, political support and military
operations poses larger ramifications for the UN and its future. In Libya, the NATO forces
intervened using the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P). However, when the Second
Libyan Civil War began, the NATO forces did not intervene. The R2P Doctrine, which all NATO
countries agreed upon in 2005, states a “responsibility of the international community to protect
when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations.”117 NATO intervened using this
doctrine in Libya, but when the interests of NATO countries were met, the troops pulled out,
leaving Libya in a dire situation that resulted in the Second Civil War. Notably, NATO forces did
not re-enter Libya in this Second Civil War, even though, under R2P Doctrine, they had a
responsibility to do so, just as much as their first intervention. The elective implementation of the
R2P doctrine entirely erodes the theory on which it stands. The Responsibility to Protect is
always present when a state is failing to protect its citizens, even when intervention would be
unpopular. NATO’s selective implementation of the doctrine erodes the power it holds. Thus, not
only did NATO forces hinder UNSMIL, but they potentially harmed one of the most important
tools the UN and its members have in preventing ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Larger ramifications can also be seen in the DRC, MINUSMA, and UNAMA. As I
mentioned, some of the armed ethnic groups and militias that the Force Intervention Brigade
(FIB) is fighting have begun to retaliate. The Allied Democratic Forces have committed violence
against civilians explicitly in retaliation to the FARDC’s counterterrorism campaign (which was
aided by the FIB). More alarmingly, the M23 movement began to target peacekeepers directly
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within the conflict. Peacekeepers are given legal protections because they are supposed to be
impartial to the warring factions. However, because of the FIB’s collaboration with the FARDC,
MONUSCO found itself an actor in the conflict. While it is a peacekeeping mission and has the
goal of civilian protection, working with the FARDC, is harming civilians and taking sides.
Thus, the legal protections that once applied to peacekeepers are at risk of being stripped. If
PKOs continue to become involved in the conflict in the same way as MONUSCO, all
peacekeepers will face being targeted for their involvement without the legal protections to
which they were once privy. This trend of false impartiality is also seen in Afghanistan and Mali,
but to a lesser extent as peacekeepers are not being directly targeted. Nevertheless, the threat to
the future of UN peacekeeping is still present and demonstrated in each of these three missions.
Moreover, Jett, among others, argues that “Even in the most ambitious of PKOs,
however, the political structure that emerges from the peace process will still be fragile at
best.”118 However, I agree more with his previous analysis where he argues that UN assistance
missions and peacekeeping operations will always be partly due to the structure of the UN.119
The UN General Assembly is composed of 193 member states, and the Security Council, of 15.
The member states are, by definition, recognized governments of the countries they represent.
Even so, many of the wars that the UN is involved in are between recognized governments and
non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations, insurgency groups, or ethnic groups. While the
UN is supposed to protect all civilians, it often takes the side of established governments, even
when those governments are committing the atrocities, such as in the DRC. UN missions are
imperfect peacekeepers and assistants to all parties in the conflict because the UN is, by design,
partial.
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As conflicts change globally with the introduction of new technologies, ideologies, and
movements, peacekeeping and state-building will continue to evolve. The UN has historically
been slow to acknowledge its failures in the missions it deploys. Hopefully, by recognizing its
failures and working to mitigate the damage of working with military force, the UN can continue
to change the structures of its missions to meet the demands of the world as it is.
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